Much of India’s constitutional story was first written on its streets. The Champaran satyagraha, the Dandi March and the Quit India movement were protests long before they became history, and many of the men and women who later sat in the Constituent Assembly had been jailed for marching. Yet the Constitution they framed nowhere uses the words “right to protest”. The right is assembled instead from several freedoms placed side by side: the freedom of speech and expression, the freedom to assemble peaceably and without arms, the freedom to form associations, the freedom to move throughout the territory of India, and the guarantee of life and personal liberty. Each of these freedoms is, in turn, hedged by the power of the State to impose reasonable restrictions in the interests of public order and other enumerated grounds.
That tension lies at the heart of every protest case that reaches a court. The citizen’s right to dissent and the State’s duty to keep the peace are not opposites, and the Supreme Court has repeatedly described them as competing values that must be reconciled rather than ranked. This article sets out the constitutional and statutory framework that now governs protests in India, after the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and the Indian Penal Code, 1860 were replaced on 1st July 2024 by the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (“BNSS”) and the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (“BNS”). It then traces how the constitutional courts have interpreted that framework, recalls the occasions on which the courts stood firmly beside protesters, and examines the two sets of limits the law imposes: those that bind the protester, and those that bind the police and the Executive Magistrate when the time comes to disperse a crowd.
The Constitutional Foundation: Articles 19 and 21
The primary source of the right to protest is Article 19(1) of the Constitution of India, which guarantees to every citizen the freedom of speech and expression under clause (a), the right to assemble peaceably and without arms under clause (b), the right to form associations or unions under clause (c), and the right to move freely throughout the territory of India under clause (d). A placard, a slogan, a sit-in, a candle march and a hunger strike are all forms of expression, and the gathering of people to make them is an assembly. The Supreme Court has therefore treated the right to protest as the combined product of clauses (a) and (b), rather than as an independent right requiring separate textual recognition.
None of these freedoms is absolute. Article 19(2) permits the State to impose reasonable restrictions on speech and expression in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence. Article 19(3) is narrower and more important for present purposes: the right to assemble may be restricted only in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order. The words “peaceably and without arms” are themselves an internal limitation, so that an assembly which turns violent, or which is armed, falls outside the guarantee altogether. Every restriction must also be imposed by “law”; an executive instruction without statutory backing cannot curtail a fundamental right.
Article 21 adds a further dimension. Since Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978),[1] any procedure that deprives a person of life or personal liberty must be fair, just and reasonable, and this governs how the State detains, arrests and uses force against protesters. Two other provisions complete the picture. Article 19 rights are available only to citizens, while Article 21 protects every person, including a foreign national present at a demonstration. And Article 51A(i) places on every citizen a fundamental duty “to safeguard public property and to abjure violence”, a duty the courts have repeatedly invoked when assessing the conduct of protesters.
The test applied to any restriction has also evolved. The early standard, laid down in State of Madras v. V.G. Row (1952),[2] asked whether a restriction was reasonable having regard to the nature of the right, the purpose of the restriction, the extent of the evil sought to be remedied and the prevailing conditions. The modern standard is proportionality: the measure must pursue a legitimate aim, must be suitable to achieve it, must be the least restrictive of the available alternatives, and must strike a fair balance between the right and the public interest. This four-part test, articulated in Modern Dental College and Research Centre v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2016)[3] and Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017),[4] was applied directly to protest-related restrictions in Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (2020),[5] and it now frames almost every challenge to a prohibitory order or a police measure.
The Statutory Framework After the New Criminal Laws
The constitutional guarantee operates against a dense body of statute, most of which was renumbered, and in places altered, when the new criminal laws came into force on 1st July 2024. Chapter XI of the BNSS, titled “Maintenance of Public Order and Tranquillity”, carries forward the old Chapter X of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 148 BNSS (formerly Section 129 CrPC) empowers an Executive Magistrate, the officer in charge of a police station or, in his absence, any police officer not below the rank of Sub-Inspector, to command an unlawful assembly, or any assembly of five or more persons likely to disturb the public peace, to disperse. It then becomes the duty of the members to disperse, and if they do not, force may be used and the members arrested. Section 149 BNSS (formerly Section 130) permits the District Magistrate, or an Executive Magistrate authorised by him, to call in the armed forces only where the assembly “cannot otherwise be dispersed” and its dispersal is necessary for public security. Section 150 (formerly Section 131) allows a commissioned officer of the armed forces to act on his own where public security is manifestly endangered and no Executive Magistrate can be contacted, and Section 151 (formerly Section 132) bars the prosecution of officers for acts done under these provisions without the sanction of the Central or State Government.[6]
The most frequently used instrument against protests is Section 163 BNSS, which replaces the familiar Section 144 CrPC. It empowers a District Magistrate, a Sub-Divisional Magistrate or a specially empowered Executive Magistrate, in urgent cases of nuisance or apprehended danger, to direct any person to abstain from a certain act, and the order may be passed ex parte. An order under Section 163 cannot remain in force for more than two months, though the State Government may extend it by a further period not exceeding six months.[7] Two preventive provisions sit alongside it. Section 170 BNSS (formerly Section 151 CrPC) permits a police officer to arrest without warrant a person designing to commit a cognizable offence, if the offence cannot otherwise be prevented. Section 172 BNSS is new: it binds every person to conform to the lawful directions of a police officer given under that Chapter, and allows the officer to detain or remove anyone who resists, refuses, ignores or disregards such a direction, who must then be taken before a Magistrate or, in petty cases, released within twenty-four hours.[8] The Code of Criminal Procedure contained no equivalent, and Section 172 is increasingly invoked to justify the short “detentions” of protesters that have become common in the national capital.
The substantive offences are in Chapter XI of the BNS. Section 189 defines an unlawful assembly as an assembly of five or more persons whose common object is, among other things, to overawe the Government or a public servant by criminal force, to resist the execution of any law or legal process, or to commit mischief or criminal trespass. Its Explanation preserves the old rule that an assembly which was lawful when it gathered may later become unlawful. Section 190 makes every member liable for an offence committed in prosecution of the common object, Section 191 punishes rioting with imprisonment of up to two years, rising to five years where the rioter is armed with a deadly weapon, and Section 195 punishes the assault or obstruction of a public servant engaged in dispersing an unlawful assembly. Disobedience of a prohibitory order is punishable under Section 223 BNS (formerly Section 188 IPC), but a court may take cognizance of that offence only on a written complaint by the public servant concerned or his superior.[9]
Several special enactments complete the framework. Section 30 of the Police Act, 1861, and its counterparts in the State Police Acts, empower the police to regulate the route and timing of processions and to require a licence for assemblies, and this is the source of the familiar requirement of prior permission. Section 20(2)(b) of the Telecommunications Act, 2023, read with the Telecommunications (Temporary Suspension of Services) Rules, 2024, governs internet shutdowns: an order may be passed only by the Union or State Home Secretary, must record reasons, and must be examined by a Review Committee within five days, which may set it aside.[10] The Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 punishes mischief causing damage to public property with imprisonment of up to five years, and damage by fire or explosive substance with rigorous imprisonment of one to ten years.[11] Finally, particular classes of persons face restrictions of their own. Rule 7 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964 bars government servants from demonstrations prejudicial to the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order, and from resorting to any form of strike in connection with their service, while the Police Forces (Restriction of Rights) Act, 1966 curtails the associational rights of members of the police.[12]
How the Constitutional Courts Have Read the Right
The foundational judgment is Kameshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar (1962), where a Constitution Bench examined Rule 4A of the Bihar Government Servants’ Conduct Rules, which forbade government servants from participating in any demonstration or resorting to any form of strike in connection with their conditions of service. The Court held that a demonstration is a visible manifestation of the feelings of a group, and therefore a form of speech and assembly protected by Article 19(1)(a) and (b), so long as it is not violent or disorderly. The rule was struck down to the extent it prohibited every form of demonstration, however peaceful, but upheld to the extent it prohibited strikes, which the Court held were not a fundamental right.[13] That distinction, between peaceful demonstration as protected expression and the strike as an unprotected weapon, has shaped the law ever since.
The Court then turned to the State’s power to prohibit assemblies. In Babulal Parate v. State of Maharashtra (1961) and, decisively, in the seven-Judge Bench decision in Madhu Limaye v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Monghyr (1970), it upheld the constitutional validity of Section 144 of the Code, but read it narrowly. The power was held to be one for emergencies, to be exercised only where there is a real and imminent danger, and the order must set out the material facts on which it rests so that its legality can be tested in court.[14] In Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar (1966), the Court supplied the vocabulary that still governs these cases, describing law and order, public order and the security of the State as three concentric circles of decreasing size. An act may disturb law and order without disturbing public order, and only a threat to public order, affecting the community at large rather than individuals, can justify a restriction under Article 19(3).[15] Earlier, in Superintendent, Central Prison, Fatehgarh v. Ram Manohar Lohia (1960), the Court had insisted that the connection between a restriction and public order must be proximate, not remote, conjectural or far-fetched.
The right to use public spaces for protest was addressed in Himat Lal K. Shah v. Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad (1973). A rule under the Bombay Police Act required prior permission for any public meeting on a street, without laying down any guidance for granting or refusing it. The Court struck down the rule, holding that while the State may regulate the use of streets and public places so that their primary purpose is not defeated, it cannot leave the grant of permission to the unguided discretion of an official, and cannot effectively deny the citizen the use of public places for assembly.[16] That principle, that regulation is permissible but uncontrolled discretion and blanket denial are not, recurs in every later judgment.
The Court has also refused to let the threat of a hostile reaction defeat the right. In S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram (1989), it held that expression can be suppressed only where the danger it creates is imminent and directly connected to it, comparable to “a spark in a powder keg”, and that the State cannot plead its own inability to maintain order as a reason to suppress lawful expression.[17] Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) added the now-settled distinction between discussion, advocacy and incitement: only incitement, and not the mere advocacy of a cause however unpopular, may be restricted on the ground of public order.[18]
The most important modern restatement of these principles is Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (2020), decided in the context of the restrictions imposed in Jammu and Kashmir in August 2019. The Court held that the power under Section 144 may be exercised both where there is present danger and where there is an apprehension of danger, but only where the danger is in the nature of an emergency. It declared that the power cannot be used to suppress the legitimate expression of opinion or grievance or the exercise of any democratic right, that an order must state the material facts to permit judicial review, that the Magistrate must apply the principle of proportionality and choose the least intrusive measure, and that repetitive orders would amount to an abuse of power.[19] These holdings now apply with full force to Section 163 BNSS, which reproduces the substance of Section 144 without any material change.
When the Courts Stood by the Protester
The principles described above are best understood through the occasions on which the courts applied them in favour of those who had taken to the streets. The most cited is In Re: Ramlila Maidan Incident v. Home Secretary, Union of India (2012). On the night of 4th and 5th June 2011, the Delhi Police, having promulgated an order under Section 144 around midnight, entered the Ramlila Maidan where Baba Ramdev’s supporters lay asleep after a day of fasting against black money, and cleared the ground with tear gas and lathis. One woman, Rajbala, later died of her injuries. Taking suo motu cognizance, a Bench of Justices B.S. Chauhan and Swatanter Kumar held that the citizen’s right to assemble and to protest peacefully is a fundamental right that cannot be taken away by arbitrary executive action, and that the decision to forcibly evict a sleeping crowd at midnight “suffers from the element of arbitrariness and abuse of power to some extent”. There was no imminent threat to public order to justify the order, and no adequate warning or time to disperse was given. The Court awarded compensation of Rs. 5 lakh to Rajbala’s family, Rs. 50,000 to each grievously injured person and Rs. 25,000 to those with simple injuries, but it also held the organisers guilty of contributory negligence for not asking the crowd to disperse peacefully, and apportioned a quarter of the liability to them.[20] The judgment is therefore as much a lesson in mutual obligation as it is a vindication of the protester.
In Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan v. Union of India (2018), the Court was confronted with an order of the National Green Tribunal of October 2017 that had effectively ended all demonstrations at Jantar Mantar, and with the Delhi Police’s practice of renewing prohibitory orders over the Boat Club lawns as soon as the previous one lapsed. A Bench of Justices A.K. Sikri and Ashok Bhushan held that there could not be a complete or absolute ban on protests at these places, while recognising that no one may claim the right to protest at a place of his choosing. It directed the Commissioner of Police to frame guidelines regulating the number of participants, the minimum distance from Parliament, the Supreme Court and other sensitive buildings, and the duration of demonstrations.[21] The judgment drew the line that still governs Delhi: regulation is lawful, prohibition is not.
During the farmers’ agitation on the borders of Delhi, a Bench presided over by Chief Justice S.A. Bobde was asked in Rakesh Vaishnav v. Union of India to order the removal of the protesters. By its order of 17th December 2020, the Court refused, recording that the right to protest is part of a fundamental right that may be exercised subject to public order, and directing that the protest be allowed to continue without impediment and without any breach of the peace by either the protesters or the police.[22] The Court went on, in January 2021, to stay the implementation of the three farm laws and to appoint a committee to hear the farmers.
The High Courts have been equally firm. In February 2020, the Aurangabad Bench of the Bombay High Court, in Iftekhar Zakee Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, set aside an order refusing permission for a peaceful protest against the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019, observing that persons cannot be branded traitors or anti-nationals merely because they wish to protest against a law.[23] In June 2021, the Delhi High Court in Asif Iqbal Tanha v. State (NCT of Delhi) granted bail to three student activists charged under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 in the north-east Delhi riots case, holding that the right to protest flows from Article 19(1)(b) and is not outlawed, and that the State, in its anxiety to suppress dissent, had blurred the line between protest and terrorist activity. The Supreme Court directed that the judgment not be treated as a precedent, but it declined to disturb the bail and later dismissed the State’s appeal.[24]
The Supreme Court has more recently extended the same protection to dissent expressed outside the street. In Javed Ahmad Hajam v. State of Maharashtra (2024), it quashed a prosecution against a college professor whose WhatsApp status described 5th August, the day Article 370 was abrogated, as a “Black Day” for Jammu and Kashmir. The Court held that every citizen has the right to criticise any decision of the State, that the right to dissent in a lawful manner is part of Article 19(1)(a), and that it is also part of the right to a dignified life under Article 21.[25] In Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat (2025), it quashed an FIR registered over a poem posted on social media, cautioning the police that even after 75 years of the Constitution, they must understand the guarantee of free expression and must actually read or hear the words complained of before registering a case.[26]
The most recent instances are barely weeks old. After the “Sansad Chalo” march towards Parliament on 20th July 2026, organised by the Cockroach Janta Party over repeated examination paper leaks, ended in lathi charges, tear gas and the alleged use of pellet guns, a Bench of Chief Justice Surya Kant and Justices Joymalya Bagchi and V. Mohana took up the resulting petitions, the Chief Justice observing during the hearing that the right to peaceful protest is “absolutely guaranteed” and that agitation cannot justify police excesses. By its order of 28th July 2026, the Court found a prima facie case for an independent probe, barred coercive action against protesters other than those with criminal antecedents, ordered the release of detained minors, directed the preservation of CCTV, drone and body-camera footage, and prohibited the publication of protesters’ personal data. On 3rd August 2026 it clarified that “criminal antecedents” meant only grave and heinous offences, left the States free to withdraw protest-related FIRs, and announced its intention to lay down a complete protocol governing the use of pellet guns.[27] Then, on 9th October 2026, in M.A. Baby v. Union of India, the same Bench examined the closure of 57 Delhi Metro stations and the cancellation of trains into the capital ahead of a protest at Jantar Mantar. It held the notifications to be “overreaching, as they impose a complete ban upon essential public transportation”, drew a distinction between regulation and total prohibition, and directed that services run in a regulated manner consistent with proportionality.[28]
The Restraints Protesters Must Observe
The first and most fundamental restraint is written into Article 19(1)(b) itself: the assembly must be peaceable and without arms. The moment a gathering turns violent, or its members carry weapons, it loses constitutional protection and becomes an unlawful assembly, with every member exposed to liability under Sections 189 to 191 of the BNS for acts done in prosecution of the common object. The duty extends to organisers. In the Ramlila Maidan case, the Supreme Court held the organisers guilty of contributory negligence precisely because they did not ask the crowd to disperse peacefully when directed to do so, and the fundamental duty under Article 51A(i) to abjure violence and safeguard public property is regularly invoked by the courts against those who lead agitations.
The second restraint concerns place and duration. In Amit Sahni v. Commissioner of Police (2020), arising from the months-long sit-in at Shaheen Bagh against the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, the Supreme Court acknowledged that democracy and dissent go hand in hand, but held that public ways and public spaces cannot be occupied indefinitely, that demonstrations must be held in designated places, and that the administration is bound to keep public roads free of obstruction without waiting for a court to direct it.[29] Dismissing a review petition in February 2021, the same Bench added that the right to protest “cannot be anytime and everywhere”, and that while spontaneous protests may occur, prolonged dissent cannot justify the continued occupation of a public place to the detriment of the rights of others.[30] Read with Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan, which held that no one may insist on protesting at a place of his choice, the law today recognises a right to protest in public, but not a right to choose the venue or to hold it indefinitely. A related obligation is to seek permission where the law requires it. Section 30 of the Police Act, 1861 and the State Police Acts permit the police to prescribe conditions, routes and timings, and on 9th October 2026 the Supreme Court observed that a protest held without permission may be unlawful and expose its participants to prosecution, while also asking the Union Government to consider an alternative protest venue to Jantar Mantar with adequate facilities.[31]
The third restraint is that a protest may persuade but not coerce. A Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in Bharat Kumar K. Palicha v. State of Kerala (1997) distinguished a hartal, which is a voluntary call to suspend work, from a bandh, which by its nature compels others to shut down under the threat of violence. The calling and enforcing of a bandh was held to violate the fundamental rights of the rest of the citizenry, and the Supreme Court affirmed that view in Communist Party of India (M) v. Bharat Kumar (1998).[32] The same logic underlies the courts’ insistence that protesters not block highways, railway lines, hospitals or access to essential services.
The fourth restraint is financial and personal accountability for damage. In In Re: Destruction of Public and Private Properties v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2009), acting on the reports of committees chaired by Justice K.T. Thomas and Mr. F.S. Nariman, the Supreme Court laid down that where property is damaged during an agitation, liability may be fastened not only on the actual perpetrators but also on the organisers who called for the direct action, and that the High Courts may appoint Claims Commissioners to assess damage and award compensation. In Kodungallur Film Society v. Union of India (2018), a Bench led by Chief Justice Dipak Misra strengthened these guidelines by directing the appointment of nodal police officers in every district, the videography of violent incidents, and swift prosecution under the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984.[33]
The fifth restraint concerns the form of protest. The courts have consistently held that there is no fundamental right to strike. All India Bank Employees’ Association v. National Industrial Tribunal (1962) held that the right to form associations does not carry with it a right to strike, T.K. Rangarajan v. Government of Tamil Nadu (2003) held that government employees have no fundamental, statutory or moral right to strike, and Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India (2003) held that advocates have no right to strike or to boycott courts.[34] Speech at a protest remains subject to the ordinary criminal law: incitement to violence, the promotion of enmity between groups and imputations prejudicial to national integration are punishable under Sections 196 and 197 of the BNS, and acts endangering the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India under Section 152. The use of loudspeakers is regulated by the Noise Pollution (Regulation and Control) Rules, 2000, which prohibit their use between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. except in closed premises, a restriction the Supreme Court upheld in In Re: Noise Pollution (2005).[35] Finally, the fast-unto-death, a protest form as old as the freedom struggle, now carries a statutory risk. While the BNS has dropped the general offence of attempting suicide, Section 226 punishes an attempt to commit suicide made with the intent to compel or restrain a public servant from discharging his official duty with simple imprisonment of up to one year, fine or community service. The provision requires proof of an actual attempt at suicide and not merely of fasting, but it plainly has hunger strikes in view.[36]
The Restraints on Authorities While Dispersing a Protest
If the protester’s obligations are considerable, the State’s are more exacting, because it is the State that holds the power of arrest and the monopoly of force. The restraints begin well before any crowd gathers. Permission to protest cannot be left to the unguided discretion of an official (Himat Lal K. Shah), a blanket ban on demonstrations in an area is impermissible (Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan), and an order under Section 163 BNSS must rest on material showing an emergency, must state the facts on which it is based, must be the least restrictive measure available, and may not be renewed mechanically or used to stifle the legitimate expression of grievance (Anuradha Bhasin).[37] The same proportionality governs collateral measures. Internet suspensions must follow the procedure under the Telecommunications Act, 2023 and the 2024 Rules, must be temporary, and are subject to review, while the Supreme Court’s order of 9th October 2026 in M.A. Baby makes clear that the State may regulate public transport around a protest but may not shut it down altogether in anticipation of one.[38]
When the State decides to disperse an assembly, the BNSS prescribes a sequence that cannot be inverted. Under Section 148, the competent officer must first command the assembly to disperse, and force may be used only if it does not, or if its conduct shows a determination not to disperse. Civil force must be tried before the armed forces are called in, which Section 149 permits only where the assembly “cannot otherwise be dispersed” and its dispersal is necessary for public security, and only on the requisition of the District Magistrate or an Executive Magistrate authorised by him. Section 149(3) obliges the armed forces to use as little force, and to do as little injury to person and property, as is consistent with dispersal. Although Section 148 does not repeat that phrase, the courts have consistently read the same principle of minimum and proportionate force into every dispersal. The Ramlila Maidan judgment illustrates the point: a crowd must be given an adequate warning and reasonable time to leave, and a sleeping assembly cannot be cleared at midnight by tear gas and lathis where no imminent threat to public order exists.[39]
The State police manuals give practical shape to this principle through a graded response, which begins with warnings and announcements and proceeds, only as each step fails, to water cannon, tear gas, lathi charge and, as an absolute last resort, firearms. In the litigation arising from the “Sansad Chalo” march of July 2026, the Supreme Court examined whether the use of pellet guns conformed to this graded framework, noted that police rules permit such force only in exceptional circumstances, directed the Delhi Police to place its standard operating procedure on record, and announced that it would lay down a complete protocol on how and where pellet guns may be used.[40] The petitions also sought guidelines prohibiting plainclothes officers from crowd control, which is consistent with the long-standing requirement in D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (1997) that police personnel carry accurate, visible and clear identification and name tags.
The restraints continue after a protester is taken into custody. Article 22 requires that he be informed of the grounds of arrest, be allowed to consult a lawyer of his choice, and be produced before a Magistrate within twenty-four hours, and the requirements in D.K. Basu of an arrest memo and intimation to a relative apply in full. Since most protest-related offences, such as unlawful assembly, simple rioting and disobedience of a prohibitory order, carry punishments well below seven years, the principle in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar (2014), now embodied in Section 35 BNSS, makes arrest the exception, with a notice of appearance the rule. Section 43 BNSS adds that a woman may not be touched for the purpose of arrest except by a female officer unless the circumstances otherwise require, and may not be arrested between sunset and sunrise save in exceptional circumstances and with the prior permission of a Judicial Magistrate.[41] The new power under Section 172 BNSS to detain a person who disregards a lawful police direction is not a licence for punitive or open-ended detention: the direction must itself be lawful, and the person must be produced before a Magistrate or released within twenty-four hours. Nor may preventive detention laws be used as a substitute for ordinary criminal law; in Banka Sneha Sheela v. State of Telangana (2021), the Supreme Court reiterated that preventive detention is justified only by a threat to public order and not by an apprehended breach of law and order.[42]
Finally, the State is accountable for what it does. Where police action violates Article 21, the constitutional courts may award public-law compensation, as in Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa (1993) and in the Ramlila Maidan case itself. A death or disappearance in police custody must be inquired into by a Judicial Magistrate under Section 196(2) BNSS, other deaths may be the subject of a magisterial inquiry under Section 196(1), and while Section 151 BNSS requires government sanction to prosecute officers for acts purporting to be done in dispersing an assembly, its exemption from criminal liability extends only to acts done in good faith.[43] The recovery of damages from protesters must also follow the judicially prescribed route: in 2022 the Supreme Court pulled up the Uttar Pradesh Government for issuing recovery notices to anti-CAA protesters through its district administrations, contrary to the procedure laid down in the Destruction of Public and Private Properties and Kodungallur cases.[44] The orders of July and August 2026, directing the preservation of CCTV, drone, body-camera and wireless records, prohibiting the publication of protesters’ personal data, and contemplating a Special Investigation Team or a committee headed by a former judge to inquire into allegations of excess, show the courts building an accountability framework through litigation, case by case, in the absence of a statutory one.[45]
The International Standard
India’s law of protest also has an international dimension. Article 20(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights guarantees the freedom of peaceful assembly, and Article 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which India acceded in 1979, recognises the right of peaceful assembly and permits only those restrictions that are imposed in conformity with law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety, public order, public health or morals, or the rights and freedoms of others.[46] Indian courts have long drawn on such instruments, read with Article 51(c) of the Constitution, to give content to the fundamental rights.
In 2020, the UN Human Rights Committee adopted General Comment No. 37 on Article 21, the most detailed international statement of the right to date. It treats an assembly that turns violent as falling outside the protection of the right, but it also warns States against relying on vague notions of public order to justify broad restrictions. It prefers a system of notification to one of authorisation, and where authorisation regimes persist, it expects them to operate in practice as notification systems, with permission granted as a matter of course; a failure to notify, it says, does not in itself render participation in an assembly unlawful. On the use of force, it states that firearms are not an appropriate tool for the policing of assemblies and must never be used simply to disperse one.[47] The UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, 1990, similarly require that unlawful but non-violent assemblies be dispersed without force or with the minimum force practicable.[48]
Measured against these standards, Indian law converges on the use of force, where the Ramlila Maidan judgment and the orders of 2026 reflect the same emphasis on necessity, proportionality and accountability. It diverges, however, on prior permission. The Indian framework remains essentially an authorisation regime, and the recent observation that a protest held without permission may itself be unlawful sits uneasily with both Himat Lal K. Shah, which forbade unguided discretion in granting permission, and the international preference for notification. That tension is likely to define the next phase of litigation on the subject.
Conclusion: A Right Held in Trust by Both Sides
Six decades of case law have left the doctrine in a reasonably settled state. Peaceful protest is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a) and (b), lawful dissent is part of the right to a dignified life under Article 21, and any restriction must answer to the test of proportionality. Against that, the protester has no right to violence, to coercion, to the indefinite occupation of public ways, to a venue of his choosing, or to strike. Neither proposition is seriously contested any longer.
The real contest lies in practice, where the doctrine is often outrun by events. Prohibitory orders under Section 163 continue to be issued as a matter of routine, the new detention power under Section 172 is increasingly invoked to round up demonstrators in the capital, and the suspension of internet and transport services has emerged as a preventive tool in its own right. The litigation of 2026 shows the Supreme Court responding with vigour, but also improvising: a probe framework in one order, a clarification on FIRs in the next, a promised protocol on pellet guns, and a direction on Metro services on the eve of a protest. As thoughtful commentators have observed, none of this binds the next government facing the next crowd, because India still has no statutory framework for the policing of assemblies.[49]
That gap ought to be filled by Parliament rather than by successive Benches. A sensible framework would replace discretionary permission with a notification regime and time-bound decisions, require designated protest sites with basic facilities in every major city, codify the graded use of force with an express ban on firearms for mere dispersal, mandate visible identification and body-worn cameras for officers on crowd duty, and subject every Section 163 order and every shutdown to prompt and independent review. Such a law would serve protesters and the police alike, because both need to know in advance where the line lies.
Until then, the right to protest will continue to rest on the principle the Supreme Court articulated in the Shaheen Bagh review: the constitutional scheme carries with it both a right to protest and the obligation to observe certain duties. That principle cuts both ways. The protester must keep the assembly peaceful, non-coercive and mindful of the rights of others; the State must regulate rather than prohibit, warn before it acts, use no more force than necessary, and answer for its conduct afterwards. A democracy that holds both sides to these obligations does not merely tolerate dissent; it is strengthened by it.
[1] Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248.
[2] State of Madras v. V.G. Row, AIR 1952 SC 196.
[3] Modern Dental College and Research Centre v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2016) 7 SCC 353.
[4] Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1.
[5] Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, (2020) 3 SCC 637.
[6] Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, ss. 148 to 151 (corresponding to ss. 129 to 132 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973).
[7] Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, s. 163 (corresponding to s. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973).
[8] Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, ss. 170 and 172.
[9] Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, ss. 189 to 191, 195 and 223; Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, s. 215(1)(a).
[10] Telecommunications Act, 2023, s. 20(2)(b); Telecommunications (Temporary Suspension of Services) Rules, 2024.
[11] Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984, ss. 3 and 4.
[12] Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964, r. 7; Police Forces (Restriction of Rights) Act, 1966.
[13] Kameshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 1166.
[14] Babulal Parate v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1961 SC 884; Madhu Limaye v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Monghyr, (1970) 3 SCC 746.
[15] Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 740; Superintendent, Central Prison, Fatehgarh v. Ram Manohar Lohia, AIR 1960 SC 633.
[16] Himat Lal K. Shah v. Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad, (1973) 1 SCC 227.
[17] S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram, (1989) 2 SCC 574.
[18] Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1.
[19] Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, (2020) 3 SCC 637.
[20] In Re: Ramlila Maidan Incident dt. 4/5.06.2011 v. Home Secretary, Union of India, (2012) 5 SCC 1; 2012 INSC 103.
[21] Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan v. Union of India, (2018) 17 SCC 324, decided on 23 July 2018.
[22] Rakesh Vaishnav v. Union of India, W.P. (C) No. 1118 of 2020, order dated 17 December 2020, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 1032 https://www.scobserver.in/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/21097_2020_31_28_25081_Order_17-Dec-2020.pdf accessed 11 October 2026.
[23] Iftekhar Zakee Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, Bombay High Court (Aurangabad Bench), decided on 13 February 2020 (T.V. Nalawade and M.G. Sewlikar, JJ.).
[24] Asif Iqbal Tanha v. State (NCT of Delhi), Delhi High Court, judgment dated 15 June 2021; Supreme Court order dated 18 June 2021 in the appeal of the State (NCT of Delhi).
[25] Javed Ahmad Hajam v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 INSC 187; [2024] 3 SCR 317, decided on 7 March 2024.
[26] Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, 2025 INSC 410, Criminal Appeal No. 1545 of 2025, decided on 28 March 2025.
[27] Supreme Court of India, orders dated 28 July 2026 and 3 August 2026 in the petitions arising from the “Sansad Chalo” march of 20 July 2026 (Surya Kant, CJI, Joymalya Bagchi and V. Mohana, JJ.) https://api.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2026/44078/44078_2026_1_28_72185_Order_28-Jul-2026.pdf; Kanu Sarda, ‘CJP protests: SC rules states free to withdraw FIRs against student agitators’ (The Week, 3 August 2026) https://www.theweek.in/news/india/2026/08/03/sc-rules-states-free-to-withdraw-firs-against-student-protesters.html accessed 11 October 2026.
[28] M.A. Baby v. Union of India, W.P. (C) No. 63560 of 2026, order dated 9 October 2026; Debby Jain, ‘Don’t Completely Stop Trains/Metro In Delhi To Handle October 10 Protests: Supreme Court To Centre’ (LiveLaw, 9 October 2026) https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/dont-completely-stop-trainsmetro-in-delhi-allow-services-in-regulated-manner-supreme-court-to-centre-on-oct-10-protests-553920 accessed 11 October 2026.
[29] Amit Sahni v. Commissioner of Police, (2020) 10 SCC 439, decided on 7 October 2020.
[30] Kaniz Fatima v. Commissioner of Police, Review Petition (C) Diary No. 24552 of 2020 in Civil Appeal No. 3282 of 2020, order dated 9 February 2021.
[31] ‘Protests without permission may invite legal action: Supreme Court’ (Kerala Kaumudi, 10 October 2026) https://keralakaumudi.com/en/india/general/supreme-court-protests-without-permission-legal-action-1813164 accessed 11 October 2026.
[32] Bharat Kumar K. Palicha v. State of Kerala, AIR 1997 Ker 291 (FB); Communist Party of India (M) v. Bharat Kumar, (1998) 1 SCC 201.
[33] In Re: Destruction of Public and Private Properties v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2009) 5 SCC 212; Kodungallur Film Society v. Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 713, decided on 1 October 2018.
[34] All India Bank Employees’ Association v. National Industrial Tribunal, AIR 1962 SC 171; T.K. Rangarajan v. Government of Tamil Nadu, (2003) 6 SCC 581; Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India, (2003) 2 SCC 45.
[35] Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, ss. 152, 196 and 197; Noise Pollution (Regulation and Control) Rules, 2000, r. 5; In Re: Noise Pollution, (2005) 5 SCC 733.
[36] Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, s. 226.
[37] See notes 16, 21 and 19 above.
[38] See notes 10 and 28 above.
[39] Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, ss. 148 and 149; see note 20 above.
[40] ‘Supreme Court puts police pellet gun use under lens, seeks SOP on crowd-control protocols’ (The Week, 30 July 2026) https://www.theweek.in/news/india/2026/07/30/supreme-court-pellet-gun-use-protest-delhi-police-sop-pellet-guns-neet-ug-strike.html accessed 11 October 2026; see also note 27 above.
[41] D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, (1997) 1 SCC 416; Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2014) 8 SCC 273; Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, ss. 35 and 43.
[42] Banka Sneha Sheela v. State of Telangana, (2021) 9 SCC 415.
[43] Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa, (1993) 2 SCC 746; Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, ss. 151 and 196.
[44] Parwaiz Arif Titu v. State of Uttar Pradesh (Supreme Court); see the report in LiveLaw https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/supreme-court-up-govt-anti-caa-protests-recovery-of-losses-damage-to-public-properties-191767 accessed 11 October 2026.
[45] See note 27 above.
[46] Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, art. 20(1); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, art. 21.
[47] UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 37 (2020) on the Right of Peaceful Assembly (Article 21), CCPR/C/GC/37.
[48] Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, 1990, Principles 12 to 14.
[49] Samridh Chaturvedi, ‘India dispatch: Supreme Court clarifies student protest order exposing flawed policing of dissent’ (JURIST, 11 August 2026) https://www.jurist.org/news/2026/08/india-dispatch-supreme-court-clarifies-student-protest-order-exposing-ad-hoc-policing-of-dissent/ accessed 11 October 2026.
