The judgment delivered by the Delhi High Court (“Court”) in Laksh Vir Singh Yadav v. Union of India & Ors. and Connected Matters[W.P.(C) 1021/2016] on 29th May 2026, is likely to be remembered as one of the most important privacy decisions rendered by an Indian constitutional court since the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1. Running into more than one hundred and forty pages and deciding a large batch of petitions involving diverse factual situations, the Court undertook perhaps the most comprehensive judicial examination in India of the Right to be Forgotten, the concept of informational privacy, the role of search engines in the digital ecosystem, and the constitutional limits of public access to judicial records.
At its core, the judgment confronts a distinctly twenty-first century problem. Modern technology has fundamentally altered the relationship between individuals and information. Events that occurred decades ago, allegations that never resulted in conviction, matrimonial disputes that have long been settled, and proceedings that ended in acquittal or discharge can now be instantly retrieved by anyone in the world through a simple internet search. As it is said, that individual can forget its past, but the internet would not let him do so. Search engines have created a permanent digital memory in which information does not fade with time. The consequence is that individuals often continue to suffer reputational, social and professional consequences long after the legal system itself has determined that the matter has ended.
The Court recognised that this phenomenon raises profound constitutional questions. While transparency and public access to judicial proceedings are indispensable to the rule of law, the unlimited digital dissemination of personal information also implicates dignity, autonomy and privacy. The Court was therefore called upon to determine how constitutional law must respond when these competing interests collide.
The Constitutional Question Before the Court
The Court itself framed the controversy in precise terms. The issue was whether an individual whose name appears in judicial records accessible through internet search engines can invoke the right to informational privacy under Article 21 of the Constitution to seek de-indexing of such records from name-based searches and masking of personal identifiers from publicly accessible versions of judicial records.
The petitions before the Court illustrated the breadth of the problem. Some petitioners had been acquitted of criminal charges after lengthy trials. Some had obtained discharge orders. Others had secured quashing of criminal proceedings. Several were involved in matrimonial disputes whose details remained available online years after the disputes had concluded. Certain petitioners complained that they were not even accused persons but merely happened to be mentioned in judicial records. Others challenged continued circulation of news reports that no longer reflected the final legal outcome of the cases concerned.
Although the factual situations differed, the injury alleged by the petitioners was remarkably similar. Their names, when entered into search engines such as Google, immediately produced links to court orders, judgments or news reports describing allegations, disputes or proceedings that had either ended in their favour or no longer possessed contemporary relevance. The petitioners argued that the continued digital accessibility of such information violated their rights to privacy, dignity, reputation and personal liberty.
Privacy After Puttaswamy: Informational Self-Determination
The starting point of the Court’s analysis was the constitutional recognition of privacy as a fundamental right. The judgment repeatedly draws strength from the Supreme Court’s decision in Puttaswamy, where privacy was held to be intrinsic to life and personal liberty under Article 21. The Court emphasised that privacy cannot be understood narrowly as protection against physical intrusion. In contemporary society, one of the most important dimensions of privacy is informational privacy. This concerns an individual’s ability to exercise control over personal information and to determine how that information is collected, disseminated and used.
The Court observed that the digital environment has amplified the importance of informational privacy. Information once disclosed does not disappear. Instead, it remains searchable, replicable and accessible indefinitely. Search engines aggregate information from numerous sources and create enduring associations between individuals and particular events. These associations may persist irrespective of whether the underlying information continues to possess any legitimate public value.
In recognising informational privacy as a constitutional interest, the Court acknowledged that the right to control personal information forms an essential component of human dignity. A constitutional democracy committed to individual autonomy cannot permit individuals to become perpetual prisoners of their digital past.
The Emergence of the Right to be Forgotten
Having recognised informational privacy as a constitutional value, the Court proceeded to examine whether the Right to be Forgotten forms part of that guarantee.
The Court noted that the Right to be Forgotten has evolved significantly in comparative constitutional jurisprudence. The concept gained international prominence following the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos. In that case, the European Court recognised that search engines could be required to remove links to information that had become inadequate, irrelevant or excessive in relation to the purposes for which it was processed.
The Court was careful not to transplant foreign doctrines mechanically. Instead, it located the Right to be Forgotten within the constitutional framework developed by Indian courts. The judgment explains that the right flows naturally from the recognition of informational privacy in Puttaswamy. If privacy includes the right to exercise control over personal information, it logically encompasses the right to seek relief against the continued digital accessibility of information that no longer serves any legitimate public purpose.
However, the Court simultaneously cautioned against an over-expansive understanding of the doctrine. The Right to be Forgotten is not a right to rewrite history. It does not permit individuals to erase public records or eliminate truthful information merely because it is inconvenient or embarrassing. Judicial records remain part of the institutional memory of the justice system. The right is therefore directed not towards destruction of information but towards regulating its accessibility in circumstances where continued dissemination causes disproportionate harm.
Open Justice and Its Constitutional Significance
One of the most substantial portions of the judgment is devoted to the doctrine of open justice. The Court recognised that public access to judicial proceedings is a foundational principle of constitutional governance. Transparency promotes accountability, ensures public confidence in the judiciary and enables scrutiny of judicial decision-making.
The doctrine of open justice has deep historical roots. Courts do not function in secrecy. Their legitimacy is derived in part from their openness to public observation and criticism. Judicial decisions contribute to the development of legal principles and therefore must ordinarily remain accessible.
The respondents relied heavily upon this principle. They contended that judicial records are public documents and that permitting individuals to suppress access to judgments would undermine transparency and public confidence in the administration of justice.
The Court accepted the importance of these concerns but observed that the doctrine of open justice developed in a world very different from the one that exists today. Historically, court records were available in archives and registries. Although technically public, they were not universally accessible. Practical barriers limited their dissemination. The internet has eliminated those barriers.
The Court recognised that digital technology has transformed public accessibility into perpetual accessibility. Information can now be retrieved globally within seconds merely by searching a person’s name. Consequently, the traditional balance between transparency and privacy requires reconsideration in light of contemporary realities.
The Digital Age and the Problem of Perpetual Visibility
Perhaps the most insightful aspect of the judgment is its understanding of the transformative effect of search engines. The Court observed that search engines perform a function fundamentally different from that of traditional archives. Archives store information. Search engines organise, prioritise and amplify it. They determine which information is most visible and therefore most influential.
A judicial record buried in an archive may have little practical impact upon an individual’s life. The same record, when displayed prominently as the first result of a name-based internet search, may have enormous consequences. Employers, clients, business associates, educational institutions and prospective spouses frequently rely upon internet searches as a preliminary means of gathering information.
The Court therefore recognised that search engines effectively create a digital identity profile. Through repeated indexing and retrieval, they establish enduring associations between individuals and historical events. These associations may continue long after the legal relevance of the information has disappeared. This recognition forms the foundation of the Court’s ultimate conclusions regarding de-indexing and masking.
The Court’s Analysis of Earlier Indian Decisions
The judgment carefully analyses earlier Indian decisions that had touched upon the Right to be Forgotten. Particular attention is devoted to the decision of the Madras High Court in Karthick Theodore v. Registrar General, Madras High Court. In that case, the Court had recognised the privacy concerns arising from online accessibility of judicial records and had directed redaction of personal details in certain circumstances. The Delhi High Court viewed the decision as an important step towards adapting traditional legal principles to digital realities. The Court also examined the decision of the Kerala High Court in Vysakh K.G. v. Union of India. That case highlighted the tension between privacy interests and public access to information. The Delhi High Court considered these decisions as indicative of a broader judicial recognition that digital technology requires a reassessment of conventional assumptions concerning publicity and privacy.
The present judgment, however, goes significantly further. It not only acknowledges the existence of the Right to be Forgotten but also develops a structured framework governing its implementation.
De-Indexing as a Constitutional Remedy
The most significant innovation introduced by the judgment is the formal recognition of de-indexing as a constitutional remedy. The Court draws a clear distinction between deletion and de-indexing. Deletion removes information from the source. De-indexing merely removes the link between the information and a name-based search query. The Court regarded this distinction as critical. De-indexing preserves public access to judicial records while preventing disproportionate intrusion into privacy. A person searching specifically for a judgment may still locate it through conventional legal research methods. What is prevented is the automatic association of the judgment with an individual’s identity through routine internet searches.
The Court held that de-indexing may be justified where continued accessibility causes disproportionate prejudice and no overriding public interest supports continued name-based searchability. Particular categories identified by the Court include cases involving acquittal, discharge, quashing of proceedings, closure reports accepted by courts and offences compounded pursuant to settlement. In such cases, the continuation of digital associations with criminal allegations was considered especially problematic because the legal system itself had determined that the allegations should not result in penal consequences.
The Court recognised that without de-indexing, acquittal may become practically meaningless. Although the law declares an individual innocent, search engines continue to display allegations that create the opposite impression.
Identity Masking and Judicial Records
The Court also recognised that de-indexing alone may not provide adequate protection in every case. Accordingly, it developed the remedy of identity masking. Masking involves concealment of names and personal identifiers from publicly accessible digital versions of judgments and orders. Importantly, the substance of the judicial decision remains unchanged. Legal reasoning, findings and precedential value are fully preserved.
The Court explained that masking represents a less restrictive alternative to removal. It protects privacy while maintaining public access to judicial reasoning. In this respect, the judgment demonstrates a commitment to proportionality, which has become a central feature of contemporary constitutional adjudication.
The Court emphasised that complete records would continue to exist in court archives and remain accessible for legitimate legal purposes. Thus, institutional memory is preserved even as privacy interests receive protection.
Situations Where Relief May Be Refused
The Court was careful not to create an unrestricted right. The judgment acknowledges that certain categories of information may continue to possess legitimate public significance. Matters involving public officials, serious offences, public accountability, economic fraud affecting public institutions and issues concerning public safety may warrant continued accessibility.
The Court therefore rejected any automatic entitlement to de-indexing or masking. Each case must be assessed individually by balancing privacy interests against competing public interests. This balancing approach reflects the broader constitutional methodology adopted by Indian courts in cases involving competing fundamental rights.
Directions to Google, Indian Kanoon and Digital Intermediaries
The practical significance of the judgment lies largely in the directions issued to digital intermediaries. The Court recognised that constitutional rights would remain ineffective unless search engines and online platforms were required to respect judicial determinations concerning privacy. Accordingly, the Court held that where a competent court directs masking of a judicial record, search engines such as Google would be obligated to de-index the corresponding links from name-based search results. Legal databases, including Indian Kanoon, would likewise be required to ensure that the concerned judgments do not remain searchable through personal identifiers.
This aspect of the judgment effectively transforms privacy rights into enforceable digital remedies. The Court also connected these obligations to the regulatory framework established under the Information Technology Act and the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021. Judicial directions concerning masking and de-indexing were recognised as legally binding directions requiring compliance by intermediaries.
The Role of the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology
The Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology occupied an important position in the litigation because many petitions raised broader concerns regarding intermediary regulation and data governance. Although the Court refrained from issuing directions that would amount to legislation, it recognised the growing importance of statutory data protection frameworks. The judgment assumes particular significance in the context of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, which reflects legislative recognition of informational privacy and individual control over personal data.
The Court’s reasoning suggests that future interpretation of digital privacy legislation will inevitably be influenced by the constitutional principles articulated in this decision.
A New Constitutional Balance
The enduring significance of the judgment lies in its refusal to embrace simplistic solutions. The Court rejected the argument that privacy must always yield to transparency. Equally, it rejected the proposition that individuals possess a right to erase uncomfortable aspects of their past. Instead, the judgment seeks to restore constitutional balance in a technological environment where traditional assumptions have become obsolete. It recognises that the internet has altered the relationship between memory and forgetting. In the physical world, time naturally diminishes the visibility of past events. In the digital world, information remains perpetually accessible unless legal mechanisms intervene.
The Delhi High Court’s decision is therefore not merely about privacy. It is about the constitutional consequences of technological change. It acknowledges that the preservation of dignity and autonomy in the digital age requires new legal responses to problems that earlier generations never encountered. By formally recognising the Right to be Forgotten as a facet of informational privacy, by developing the remedies of de-indexing and identity masking, and by creating enforceable obligations for search engines and digital intermediaries, the Court has laid the foundation for a new chapter in Indian privacy jurisprudence. Until comprehensive legislation emerges in this field, this judgment is likely to serve as the principal authority governing the relationship between privacy, reputation, judicial transparency and digital memory in India.
Relief Secured for the Petitioner in W.P.(C) 18962 of 2025
Among the batch of petitions decided by the Delhi High Court was W.P.(C) 18962 of 2025 filed by a company engaged in the power transmission sector. The petition presented an important dimension of the Right to be Forgotten jurisprudence, namely, whether a corporate entity whose reputation continues to be adversely affected by outdated and misleading online content can seek constitutional protection against the continued digital perpetuation of disputes that have already been conclusively resolved. The petition arose from a series of news reports published by various digital media platforms in the year 2022 concerning disputes amongst shareholders and directors of the company. Several reports portrayed the company and its management as being involved in serious allegations of financial fraud, criminal conspiracy and corporate misconduct. These reports were largely founded upon FIRs that had emanated from internal disputes amongst shareholders and management factions within the company.
Subsequently, all disputes between the concerned stakeholders were amicably resolved through a comprehensive settlement. Pursuant thereto, the parties jointly approached the Allahabad High Court seeking quashing of the criminal proceedings. By order dated 29th July 2024, the Allahabad High Court quashed the concerned FIRs in view of the settlement arrived at between the parties. Thereafter, the proceedings pending before the National Company Law Tribunal, Allahabad Bench, being Company Petition No. 32/ALD/2021, also culminated in terms of the settlement and were disposed of on 27 February 2025.
Despite the complete resolution of the disputes and the closure of all consequential proceedings, internet searches of the company’s name continued to prominently display the earlier reports containing allegations of fraud and criminal wrongdoing. These reports failed to reflect the subsequent legal developments and continued to create a misleading and distorted impression regarding the company and its business affairs. The continued availability of such content adversely affected the company’s reputation, credibility and business standing before financial institutions, investors, contractors and commercial counterparties.
Appearing on behalf of the Petitioner in W.P.(C) 18962 of 2025, our Chamber argued before the Delhi High Court that the continued indexing and dissemination of such content, despite the disputes having been settled and all proceedings having attained finality, served no legitimate public purpose and amounted to a continuing invasion of the company’s right to reputation and informational privacy. It was submitted that in the digital age, stale and misleading content can inflict substantial and disproportionate harm upon a business entity long after the underlying dispute has ceased to exist.
The Delhi High Court accepted the petition for consideration as part of the larger batch concerning the Right to be Forgotten and specifically took note of the factual position that all disputes between the stakeholders had been amicably resolved, the criminal proceedings had been quashed by the Allahabad High Court, and the company proceedings before the NCLT had also been concluded. The case was accordingly treated as one falling within the broader category of matters where continued online association with past allegations required judicial scrutiny in light of the constitutional right to informational privacy.
The judgment ultimately recognised that where criminal proceedings have been quashed, disputes have been settled, and no overriding public interest survives, individuals and entities may seek appropriate relief in the form of de-indexing and masking of content that continues to cause disproportionate prejudice. The Court laid down detailed legal parameters for such relief and established a framework under which search engines, legal databases and digital intermediaries may be directed to remove name-based indexing and implement privacy-protective measures in appropriate cases.
The inclusion of the Petitioner of W.P.(C) 18962 of 2025 in this landmark judgment is significant because it demonstrates that the consequences of perpetual digital publication are not confined to private individuals alone. Commercial entities may equally suffer severe reputational and economic harm where outdated allegations continue to dominate online search results despite the complete resolution of the underlying disputes. The judgment therefore acknowledges that the constitutional values of dignity, reputation and informational autonomy can extend beyond the traditional context of personal privacy and may also arise in situations involving corporate reputation and business identity.
This decision forms part of a landmark constitutional precedent that will shape the future of digital privacy, online reputation management and the Right to be Forgotten in India.
For professional assistance concerning the Right to be Forgotten, de-indexing of online content, masking of judicial records, digital reputation management, privacy rights, intermediary liability, technology law and constitutional remedies, please contact:
Adv. Kumar Deepraj
Advocate-on-Record, Supreme Court of India
Email: mail@advkumardeepraj.com
Mobile: +91-8447248119
This landmark judgment opens a new chapter in Indian privacy jurisprudence and provides an effective constitutional remedy for individuals and businesses seeking protection against the enduring consequences of obsolete or misleading digital information.
